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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 001358

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SUBJECT: ANC PLANS TO MEDIATE ZIMBABWE CRISIS

PRETORIA 00001358 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Donald Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (C) SUMMARY. PolOff met on 23 June with Mo Shaik, one of ANC President Jacob Zuma's advisors, to discuss the ANC's plans to mediate the Zimbabwe crisis, which essentially rehashes Mbeki's current proposals for a government of national unity. Shaik said in no uncertain terms that the ANC will be neutral and that the US should not expect the ANC to favor MDC Leader Morgan Tsvangirai in any way. He also added that Mugabe would be part of a GNU, especially now that the MDC pulled out of the run-off. However, Shaik admitted the ANC has no leverage over Mugabe or ZANU-PF to negotiate a settlement and is operating under the assumption that ZANU-PF will act in good faith as the former apartheid regime did during South Africa's transition. MDC will likely initially welcome ANC involvement, but once they realize that the ANC only offers the same old wine in a new bottle, they will likely reject ANC mediation as they have Mbeki's. Post believes the most likely outcome is that Mugabe will ignore the ANC just as he has Mbeki. Post defers to Embassy Harare and Department, but Zimbabwe might be best served if neither South Africa nor the ANC were the SADC mediator. END SUMMARY.

ANC'S MAKES A NEUTRAL PLAN FOR ZIMBABWE

12. (C) PolOff met on 23 June with Mo Shaik, one of ANC President Jacob Zuma's advisors, to discuss the ANC's plans to mediate the Zimbabwe crisis. With the help of Norwegian funding, Shaik said Zuma will soon embark on a tour around SADC to convince leaders that Zuma and the ANC have a role to play. He said the ANC will appeal to liberation movements within SADC by reminding them what they fought for. When asked what Mbeki will think of all this, Shaik said that they will do this in conjunction with Mbeki. "We're not going to let anyone -- Mugabe or the US -- for that matter, pit the ANC against Mbeki or vice-versa," he warned.

13. (C) Shaik also said that he and "others" have been working non-stop for the past three days on a detailed plan that is "principled." In other words, Shaik said, the United States should not hold any notion that Zuma will favor MDC Leader Morgan Tsvangirai in any way, just as President Mbeki should not assume that the ANC will favor Robert Mugabe. "If the US thinks we're going to install Tsvangirai, they're dead wrong," he said. He also added that Mugabe will have to be part of a GNU, especially now that the MDC pulled out of the run-off. Shaik also asked PolOff to convey in the strongest

terms the ANC's request that the United States be quiet on the matter for now to give the ANC room to negotiate.

THE MECHANICS

¶4. (C) Shaik said the ANC has a six-part plan to solving the crisis. First and foremost, the ANC wants to stop all political violence in Zimbabwe. After violence has stopped, they will negotiate with the security services, including the CIO, police, and military to accept a GNU. Shaik admitted this will be no easy feat as the ANC Generals report on violence in Zimbabwe concluded that the military would launch a coup d'etat should MDC win the run-off. Once the security services are on board, they will enter into a 2-3 year GNU Qservices are on board, they will enter into a 2-3 year GNU called a Transitional Executive Authority (TEA), like South Africa's own Transitional Executive Committee during the transition). The TEA will then work on four things during the transition: creating free and fair conditions for a new election (including equal access to media, freedom of speech, right to campaign, and demilitarizing the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission), deciding who would be prosecuted for what crimes during the Mugabe regime, stabilizing the economy and lifting international sanctions, and last ensuring all humanitarian needs are met through international aid donors.

¶5. (C) Shaik anticipates three main sticking points. First, who will be prosecuted will be contentious. Though he said he would let Zimbabweans decide how they wanted to move ahead, either with a Truth and Reconciliation-like set-up or otherwise, he also said generals would have to be guaranteed a "soft exit" before they would agree to a TEA. Second, he said he expected the U.S. to refuse to lift international sanctions against regime hardliners. Last and most

PRETORIA 00001358 002.2 OF 002

contentious, he knows Mugabe's role in a GNU would not be acceptable to the U.S. PolOff expressed US concerns that given the regime's behavior, Mugabe should not be rewarded with a position in a GNU, that Mugabe has lied in the past about how long he will stay in power, and that Mugabe and regime hardliners are likely to do everything in their power to emasculate the MDC in a GNU. Though he agreed with all of these points, he said he does not see a way around it now that the MDC has pulled out unless both Mugabe and Tsvangirai agree not to be part of the new government.

MDC SHOULDN'T HAVE PULLED OUT

¶6. (C) PolOff elicited Shaik's views on MDC's refusal to participate in the run-off. He started out by saying, "if the US wants democracy, then you have nothing to complain about; MDC did not win a majority in the first round and now have pulled out of the run-off. The MDC now has no recourse." Shaik, however, added that the ANC did not and would not have advised them to pull out, believing they would have had more leverage to call and enter into a GNU after a flawed run-off election. As for the ANC's own leverage, Shaik admitted as he has in the past that the ANC does not have any particular leverage over Mugabe or ZANU-PF. PolOff asked what happens if ZANU-PF now declares victory and doesn't want to talk about a GNU, Shaik simply said, "then they don't and Zimbabwe stays as it is with Mugabe as President for another five years."

COMMENT

¶7. (C) The ANC's plan for Zimbabwe mirrors its own model during the transition: cease all political violence, level the playing field, set conditions for free and fair

elections, lift international sanctions, and decide on how to handle past crimes. However, the ANC has failed to realize that Zimbabwe is not South Africa and that Mugabe is no de Klerk. The first step was a willingness to listen to the people when the former apartheid regime allowed a free and fair referendum on apartheid, which we do not see in Zimbabwe.

18. (C) Post believes that Shaik accurately reflected the ANC's "plan." Unfortunately, the plan is a list of outcomes rather than actions that will achieve them. Embassy Harare is in position to judge ZANU-PF, but we believe that Shaik's own response to the question concerning a Mugabe declaration of victory and refusal to talk -- "then they don't and Zimbabwe stays as it is with Mugabe as President for another five years," is exactly where the ANC plan will wind up.

19. (C) Our discussions with MDC contacts lead us to believe that the MDC will initially welcome ANC involvement. However, once they realize that the ANC only offers the same old wine in a new bottle, they will likely reject ANC mediation as they have Mbeki's. We defer to Embassy Harare and the Department, but Zimbabwe might be best served if neither South Africa nor the ANC are not the SADC mediator.
TEITELBAUM